The intention-superiority effect is the finding that response latencies are faster for items related to an uncompleted intention as compared with materials that have no associated intentionality. T. Goschke and J. Kuhl (1993) used recognition latency for simple action scripts to document this effect. We used a lexical-decision task to replicate that shorter latencies were associated with uncompleted intentions as compared with neutral materials (Experiments 1 and 3) . Experiments 2-4, however, demonstrated that latencies were longer for completed scripts as compared with neutral materials. In Experiment 4, shorter latencies were also obtained for partially completed scripts. The results are discussed in terms of the activation and inhibition that may guide behavior, as well as how these results may inform theories of prospective memory.
Prospective memory is a complex form of human memory that functions in service of completing temporarily postponed intentions. Published research reports on the topic are not numerous, but the field is growing (cf. Roediger, 1996) . One distinction that is often made in this literature is between memory for what one has to accomplish versus memory that one has an intention at all. The two types of information are dissociable and have been loosely termed the "retrospective" and the "prospective" components to prospective remembering, respectively (e.g., Baddeley & Wilkins, 1984; Einstein & McDaniel, 1990) . Some theorists have referred to this distinction as memory for content versus memory for intent (e.g., Kvavilashvili, 1987) . By and large, most of the work in this area has been directed at the prospective component of this form of memory. Very little research has been devoted to investigating the nature of the retrospective representation, or memory for the intention itself (cf. Goschke & Kuhl, 1993) . This article addresses the question of whether the dynamic properties (i.e., level of activation) of an established intention change as a function of the intention's status as either fulfilled or unfulfilled.
Recently, Goschke and Kuhl (1993) reported a series of studies that suggested that the stored representation of an intention may have privileged status in memory as compared with other information. According to this view, the mental representation of an intention is stored in declarative memory, just as other types of memories are. Declarative intentions may exist, however, at a heightened level of activation, or they may at least be more readily revived than other memories. In Goschke and Kuhl's paradigm, people learned pairs of small, scripted actions such as clearing a messy desk. After a pair of scripts had been learned, people were told that they would have to perform one of the two scripts, or they were told that they would have to observe the experimenter perform one of the two scripts. These instructions turned one script into a prospective script (either to perform or to observe), and the remaining script of the panwas made a neutral script. As such, no intention to perform or to observe was associated with the neutral script.
All participants learned two pairs of scripts (i.e., four scripts total) and were tested in both of the observe and the perform conditions. The instruction as to which script was to be performed (or observed) was quite brief, was delivered after the script pair had been learned, and was followed immediately by a recognition test for all of the items contained in the pair of scripts. In four experiments, Goschke and Kuhl (1993) found that participants were faster and more accurate with items from scripts that were to be performed later by the participant as compared with items from the neutral scripts that had been paired with them. Thus, establishing the intention to perform an activity (i.e., now having prospective memory for the activity) appeared to heighten the activation of that declarative representation in memory. In contrast, prospective memory for observing the experimenter perform an activity did not result in any such heightened activation relative to a neutral script.
By applying the standard assumption that latency and activation are inversely related (e.g., Anderson, 1983; Ratcliff & McKoon, 1978) , the results were theoretically interpreted as evidence for persisting activation related to the formation of an intention. As Goschke and Kuhl (1993) noted, these results are consistent with Anderson's (1983) ACT* (adaptive control of thought) model of memory in which goal nodes are portrayed as possessing large and constant amounts of activation. These same hypothesized goal nodes are the only elements of working memory in ACT* that do not need rehearsal to sustain activation. This last point is nontrivial because one obvious alternative explanation is that on receiving the prospective instruction that a particular script will have to be performed, people rehearse or otherwise strategically change their mental representation of the to-be-performed activity. Goschke and Kuhl (1993) ruled out this counterexplanation in multiple ways. For example, as a rehearsal manipulation in their fourth experiment, they had people selectively imagine themselves performing both the prospective activity and the neutral script with which it was paired. They also had a blocking condition in which people performed Brooks's (1969) spatial-interference task to prevent rehearsal. In both conditions, an intention-superiority effect was obtained in which recognition latency was faster for "prospectiveperform scripts" (as they are called in this article) than for neutral scripts. Goschke and Kuhl ruled out a number of other alternative explanations as well (for a synopsis, see Goschke & Kuhl, 1996, p. 64 ). Because the instruction was a postlearning manipulation, selective encoding strategies could not have been the antecedent of the effect. The semantic relatedness (or lack thereof) of the target script to the neutral script also does not account for the effect. In addition, people receiving the prospective-perform instruction neither interpreted that as necessary to preparing for a free-recall test, nor interpreted the observe instruction as necessary to preparing for a recognition test in which the experimenter is watched for errors. People who were specifically told that they would receive a free-recall test on both scripts in a pair nevertheless displayed the intentionsuperiority effect.
The interpretation of the intention-superiority effect in terms of Anderson's (1983) ACT* network model of memory (and its depiction of spreading activation) has received some additional empirical support. Mantyla (1993) has found that priming a prospective response increased later prospective remembering. In his general paradigm, people were engaged first in a fluency task, such as generating semantic associates for two categories. When later engaged in a task that required generation of a first associate, people were instructed to mark an X whenever they encountered a word from one of four specific semantic categories, two of which had been primed in the fluency task. Prospective responding was better to the targets of the primed categories than the unprimed categories. Mantyla (1996) reported additional experiments along slightly different lines that were consistent with the priming of a prospective response. These priming results and their spread-of-activation interpretation are conceptually similar to Yaniv and Meyer's (1987) finding that inaccessible information in a tip-of-the-tongue paradigm received quicker judgments in a lexical-decision task than did control information (cf. Connor, Balota, & Neely, 1992) . Likewise, as McNamara (1992) has argued, no existing theory does a better job in explaining such diverse empirical findings than Anderson's network model.
In none of the reports just reviewed did the theorists claim that successful prospective remembering was a direct consequence of the heightened activation associated with an intention. Rather, all noted that many other important factors exist that affect prospective memory. Rather than review those additional factors here (see Ellis, 1996 , for a review), the purpose of this article was to explore the generality of the intention-superiority effect. To provide convergent evidence that intended activities reside in memory with some special status, we decided to use a lexical-decision task (hereinafter LDT) rather than recognition latencies. Our intuition was that a performance measure such as latency in an LDT is a more indirect measure of memory, in contrast to the direct measure of recognition. If activation is the underlying construct being measured, then one of the best measurement tasks is lexical decision (see Marsh & Landau, 1995 , for one discussion of these issues). We also felt that with the generally excellent performance in lexical decision, greater data yield might result in more stable estimates of activation as compared with recognition.
In Experiment 1, we replicated the intention-superiority paradigm, replacing the recognition measure of activation with one of lexical decision. In Experiments 2-4, we explored some straightforward theoretical predictions about the consequences of heightened activation of an intention. For example, if the intention-superiority effect reflects both activation and inhibition, then a completed activity might be expected to exhibit inhibition relative to more neutral memories. This hypothesis was tested in Experiment 2. The design of Experiment 3 served as a conceptual replication of Experiments 1 and 2 and further addressed how activation was allocated to a set of memories that contained both intentions and nonintentions. We designed Experiments 1-3 to address completed and uncompleted intentions, whereas Experiment 4 was designed to explore the level of activation of an interrupted activity.
Experiment 1
The primary motivation for this experiment was to assess whether an intention-superiority effect could be obtained using lexical-decision latency. Because the assessment of activation preceded the participants' completion of the intentions, latency was predicted to be shorter for materials contained in the prospective-perform script as compared with more neutral materials (i.e., the script that was not going to be performed). Although we added a final recognition task at the end of this experiment, no a priori prediction was made about these latencies other than that completing the activities may have equated the activation among the tasks and conditions tested. Our logic was that if the results were positive with the convergent measure of activation inferred from lexical decision, then lexical decision could also be used to assess the net effect on activation of other manipulations of interest in Experiments 2-4.
Method
Participants. Twenty-four undergraduates from the University of Georgia volunteered in exchange for partial fulfillment of a course research requirement. As noted in the Procedure section, 3 additional people were tested as replacements. An additional group of 24 undergraduates was tested in a control condition as reported in the Recognition subsection of the Results and Discussion section. Participants were tested individually in sessions that lasted approximately 40 min.
Materials. Following Goschke and Kuril's (1993) procedure, two scripts consisting of simple action phrases were constructed for each of the two study phases (i.e., blocks) of the experiment, for a total of four scripts. These scripts comprised a title (e.g., Brewing Coffee) and five sequential action phrases (e.g., insert the filter, pour the water, etc.). The scripts were distinct and held no semantic relationship to one another. Complete counterbalancing ensured that each script appeared equally often in the prospective-perform and prospective-observe conditions, and as a neutral script paired with each of those two prospective conditions. Each of the two LDTs comprised three classes of items. First, we included the 20 script words from the two studied scripts; these were the 5 verbs and 5 nouns from the action phrases in the scripts (e.g., insert, filter, pour, etc.) . Second, we also included 20 neutral but valid English words (hereinafter called "nonscript words") that did not appear in the experiment. Third, we included 40 pronounceable nonwords matched for syllabic length to the script and nonscript words, such that the probability of positive and negative responses in the LDT was 50% each.
The rationale for including nonscript words that did not appear in the experiment was threefold. First, their inclusion allowed a test of the obvious prediction that script words, having been learned earlier, should possess more activation than nonscript words. Second, inclusion of the nonscript words ensured that not all positive responses in the LDT were a function of prior learning of the scripts. Third, a recognition memory test identical to Goschke and Kuril's (1993) dependent measure was included at the end of this experiment. These nonscript words served as the lures in that test, and including them in the LDT controlled for prior exposure in the LDT. Thus, each word in the recognition test had been encountered during lexical decision. Each script word was yoked with 1 of the nonscript words to match word frequency (Kudera & Francis, 1967) and syllabic length. In each LDT, 12 buffer items for practice (6 words and 6 nonwords) preceded the 80 critical items in the test sequence. Complete randomization of the test items was under software control, with the specific items on the LDT wholly specified by which two scripts were being tested. The final recognition test was constructed by randomizing anew all of the valid English words from both LDTs (i.e., all 40 script words as targets and all 40 nonscript words as lures for a total recognition test of 80 items).
Procedure. Procedurally, the experimental sequence was almost identical to Goschke and Kuhl's (1993) . Participants were told that they would have to leam two pairs of scripted actions in each of two separate blocks of the experiment for a later memory test. In one of the blocks, they were told that they would actually have to perform one of the two scripts. In the other block, they were told that they would have to observe the experimenter perform one of the two scripts. In the latter case, people were told they would have to verify that the experimenter had performed the correct sequence of actions. As such, two scripts, one in each block, were not performed at all (i.e., they were the neutral scripts). Half of the participants were given instructions to observe in the first block and to perform in the second block, whereas the other half received instructions to perform in the reverse order.
1 Participants were additionally instructed that they would perform a countingbackward task immediately after script learning and that they would make lexical decisions just before script execution (or script observation). The details of the LDT were explained prior to script learning. Therefore, the lexical measure of activation always preceded script performance or observation in this experiment. Following Goschke and Kuhl's procedure, instructions regarding which script of a given pair was to be performed by the participant (or by the experimenter) were given immediately prior to the LDT.
In terms of initial learning, participants saw the two scripts in each block twice on the computer screen. The script title was shown for 10 s, and then each of the five action phrases was shown sequentially for 10 s. Previous phrases remained on the screen such that the title appeared for a total of 60 s by the time the last action phrase was shown. The entire script remained on the monitor for an additional 30 s, making the entire learning sequence 1 min 30 s. Both scripts were shown in this fashion, and then the entire sequence was repeated to constitute a second learning trial (for a total learning time of 6 min). Participants were then required to recall the two scripts by writing down on paper the sequence of action phrases, word for word, in the order they had learned them. If recall was not perfect, the participant went through another learning trial for each script and again attempted recall (this was only necessary for 2 participants). Immediately after successful script recall, a three-digit number appeared on the monitor, and participants were instructed to count backward by threes for 45 s, starting from that three-digit number. After counting, the computer beeped, and participants were given instructions specifying which of the two scripts was to be performed (or observed) and which was not to be executed (i.e., was neutral). The prospective instruction was displayed on the monitor for 3 s with either the message You will perform or the message You will observe followed by the assigned script title. The neutral script title paired with the prospective script was preceded by the instruction You will not perform or You will not observe. These instructions were displayed simultaneously in the center of the screen with the prospective instruction appearing above the neutral instruction.
2
Immediately after presentation of these instructions, participants engaged in the LDT. A warning tone signaled the start of the task, and participants had been previously instructed to respond "yes" if the letter string they saw was a legal English word and "no" if it was not by pressing one of two keys on the computer's keyboard. A 500-ms warning tone and fixation point preceded each item's presentation in the center of the monitor. The item disappeared when the participant responded and was followed by an intertrial interval (ITI) of 200 ms. People had been instructed previously to respond as quickly and accurately as they could. On completion of the LDT, participants were instructed either to perform or to observe the designated script, without any reference being made as to which script was to be performed or observed. Materials for the scripts were arranged on tables behind the computer workstation. There were 3 participants who either forgot which script was to be performed or who performed the script sequence incorrectly, and they were replaced.
3 After participants completed lexical decision in the second block of the experiment, and after they completed script performance (or observation), we administered the final recognition test, which required discrimination of script words from lure items. The physical aspects of the test sequence comprising the warning tone, fixation point, stimulus termination, and m were identical to those of the LDT.
These procedures constituted our attempt to replicate Goschke and Kurd's (1993) original paradigm. Therefore, our method was identical except in the following respects. First, we used lexicaldecision latency, whereas they used recognition latency. Second, our script materials were different but were composed of common, everyday objects. Third, we required criterion learning as assessed by written free recall. Fourth, our prospective instruction took 3 s, rather than 2 s, because we added the phrases You will execute and You will not execute (and similar phrases for observation) in front of the script titles. 
Results and Discussion
Unless otherwise noted, all statistical results in this article are significant below the .05 level. When specific contrasts are reported, the error term reflects the data from the specific conditions of interest. The lexical-decision results are reported first, followed by the results of the final recognition test. In this experiment and those that follow, trials reflecting incorrect responses or latencies beyond 3 SDs of a given participant's mean were excluded from the statistical analyses. In mis experiment, 3.9% of the lexical decisions were incorrect, and an additional 0.8% were eliminated because of the length of the response (i.e., because they were outliers).
Lexical decision. Pooling over the two LDTs, the first two rows of data in Table 1 set forth the overall latency for the three classes of items. An orderly pattern was obtained in which script words were responded to most quickly, followed in order by nonscript words and by nonwords which exhibited the slowest latencies. In a within-subjects onefactor analysis of variance (ANOVA) with three levels specifying the classes of items, the means differed significantly, F(2, 46) = 55.4, MSE = 3,488.3. Simple contrasts confirmed that the response latency for nonscript words differed from the latencies for both the script words, f (23) = 7.2, and the nonwords, f(23) = 5.4. We applied the standard assumption that faster latencies reflect more activation and therefore we conclude that script words possessed the most activation because they had been studied previously during the learning phase of the experiment.
Among the four scripts, latency differed as a function of the type of prospective instruction delivered after script learning. Figure 1 displays the results. In a 2 X 2 ANOVA with the variables of script type (neutral vs. prospective) and instruction (observe vs. perform), there was neither an overall difference between the script pairs assigned to die prospective-perform or the prospective-observe conditions, F(l, 23) < 1.0, nor an overall difference between the two prospective scripts combined as compared with their paired neutral scripts, F(l, 23) = 2.6,/? > .10. These two variables, however, did reliably interact, F(l,23) = 4.4, MSE = 3,251.7. As can be seen in Figure 1 , latency for the components of the prospective-observe script did not differ from latency for the components of its neutral mate, whereas responses to words from the prospective-perform script were faster as compared with words from its neutral mate. Thus, establishing the intention to perform an action later made the components of that action more activated relative to neutral materials in memory about which no intention to perform (or to observe) had been established. This difference in the prospective-perform condition was significant by simple contrast to its neutral mate as well, f(23) = 2.7.
These results with lexical decision wholly replicated Goschke and Kuhl's (1993) finding with recognition latency. As in that earlier study, the 40-ms difference observed in the prospective-perform condition may reflect both activation of the script to be performed and an inhibition of the neutral script with which it was paired. Simple analyses of the prospective-perform's neutral script showed that these items did not reliably differ from either of the scripts in the observation condition, f(23)s < 1.0. Therefore, the intention to perform a script may serve to heighten its activation and 3 These participants were replaced because we felt that the time between learning and performance was very short (on the order of 3 min). In addition, participants learned the scripts to criterion before they were told which to perform (or to observe). Therefore, inability to perform the script as learned, or worse, forgetting the instruction that was given 3 min earlier would seem to indicate exceptionally poor memory performance, or perhaps that these participants did not read the prospective instructions that had appeared for 3 s. The decision to replace these participants might have biased the results in favor of finding heightened activation because we eliminated participants on the basis of performance of the prospective-perform script (i.e., there was no corresponding rationale to replace participants on the basis of the neutral or prospective-observe materials). However, the same results were obtained when these participants were retained as when they were replaced, and we decided in favor of the latter. inhibit its neutral mate, but the intention to observe neither heightens nor inhibits the associated memorial records.
Recognition. The recognition test was administered after the prospective-perform (or observe) task was completed in the second block of the experiment. If an intention is deactivated after its completion, then response latencies to the four types'of script might be expected to show comparable levels of activation as measured by recognition latency (i.e., Goschke & Kuhl's, 1993 , dependent measure). The results are set forth as the first four rows of data in Table 2 . These data reflect the 97.2% of the trials on which a correct recognition decision was given. In a 2 X 2 ANOVA using the same variables as were used for lexical decision, prospective (perform and observe) scripts did not differ from the neutral scripts with which they were paired, F(l,23) < 1. The interesting result, which was quite unexpected, was that responses to the items from the prospective-perform scripts and their neutral partners were marginally slower (by about In constructing the LDT, nonscript items were included so that the lures in the recognition test would also have been experienced in the LDT portion of the experiment. The interpretation of these recognition latencies is slightly obscured by the fact that the items had been tested earlier in the LDT. Previous work that specifically tested the effect on subsequent recognition of taking an LDT showed that there was no influence whatsoever of the preceding LDT on recognition accuracy (MacLeod, 1989 ; see also Marsh & Landau, 1995 , for a similar argument using a recall task rather than recognition). Nevertheless, the potential importance of the finding that memories of completed tasks may be inhibited relative to memories that had no previous intentional status led us to conduct an additional control condition. In that condition, the procedure was identical to that of this experiment except that all valid words in the LDT were neutral (i.e., none of the script words were included). Therefore, the recognition latencies in this control condition were free from any sort of influence that might have arisen from their earlier appearance in the LDT. These data are reported for what they are: a post-hoc exploration conducted in a different academic term from the one reported as Experiment 1. These control data are also set forth in Table  2 . As can be seen there, once again, items comprising completed intentions to perform were recognized slightly more slowly (by about 20 ms) than items contained in scripts that had been observed. However, that difference was smaller and not reliable, F( 1,23) = 1.3, p > .2. Although the evidence is currently equivocal, completed intentions may have undergone some sort of inhibition relative to memories that had no intentional status. Why the neutral script associated with the perform script was also slower is unclear. Having been learned together, perhaps they were treated as a pair, along the lines of our instructions to participants. This possibility that completed activities undergo inhibition was explored more directly in Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
The results of Experiment 1 demonstrated that Goschke and Kuhl's (1993) intention-superiority effect could be obtained reliably with a different measure of item activation. In Experiment 1, memories related to an activity that was subsequently going to be performed were reliably faster than memories that had no such intentional status. As in Goschke and Kuhl's report, intentions not related to performance (i.e., the observe scripts) did not appear to have this privileged status in memory. The intention-superiority effect, however, may not be driven completely by the activation of intentions to be performed; it may also be a consequence of the inhibition of other memories. In Experiment 1, the only other memories that were tested were the components of the neutral script. If inhibition existed, then the results of the recognition test in Experiment 1 are suggestive that activities, once completed, might undergo the same sort of inhibition. The purpose of Experiment 2 was to test this hypothesis directly by moving the measurement of activation from before performance (or observation) to after performance of the prospective scripts. If prospectiveperform scripts undergo inhibition, or deactivation, after they are performed, then latency to its constituents in the LDT should be slower than to the constituents of its neutral partner. The prediction is ambiguous for the prospectiveobserve script and its neutral partner, but in four experiments, Goschke and Kuhl never found significant differences between their observed scripts and their neutral partners. Their results suggest that no differences should materialize with instructions to observe.
Method
Participants. Twenty-four undergraduates from the University of Georgia volunteered in exchange for course credit. None had served in Experiment 1.
Materials and procedure. The materials were identical to those of Experiment 1, as was the general procedure. The four scripts were completely counterbalanced so that each one served an equal number of times under all manipulations. Half of the participants performed a script in the first block and observed in the second block. The order was reversed for the remaining half of the participants. The successful learning of a pair of scripts was followed by the backward-counting task for 45 s. The prospectiveperform (or prospective-observe) instruction was given, followed by the participant actually performing (or observing) the appropriate sequence of actions. On average, it took participants approximately 1 min to leave their seats to perform (or to observe) the script, and to return to the computer work station. The LDT followed immediately after the prospective task had been completed or observed. People had been previously instructed in how to make lexical decisions. Composition of items in the LDT was identical to that in Experiment 1 (i.e., script words, nonscript words, and nonwords). The sequence was repeated in the second block for the prospective task (either to observe or to perform) that was not undertaken in the first block. Because of the small latency differences in Experiment 1, recognition tests were not administered in this experiment or in the ones that followed.
Results and Discussion
In lexical decision, 4.6% of the total number of trials contained an erroneous response, and 1.3% were eliminated through their identification as outlying responses.
4 Overall latency for the three classes of items in Experiment 2 is displayed in Table 1 . As was expected, script words were responded to more quickly than were nonscript items, and nonwords were identified the most slowly, F(2, 46) = 62.2, MSE = 3,080.2. By simple contrast, as before, nonscript words were slower than items learned in the script, t(23) = 6.1, but were identified more quickly than nonwords, r(23) = 7.6. This pattern of results turned out just as it should have if lexical decision measures item activation.
The critical results are set forth in Figure 2 . The important outcome was an interaction in the 2 X 2 ANO VA demonstrating that latency for the prospective-perform script was much longer after it had been completed as compared with the remaining scripts tested in this experiment, F(l, 23) = 5.1, MSE = 2,873.5. Therefore, measuring activation after the completion of an intention suggests that inhibitory mechanisms may constitute an important component of the intention-superiority effect, as originally speculated by Goschke and Kuhl (1993) . A main effect was observed in the comparison of the two prospective scripts with the two neutral scripts. This effect was driven by the much slower latencies for the components of the prospective-perform script, F(l, 23) = 5.7, MSE = 2,569.1. The simple comparison of the perform script and its neutral partner was reliable as well, f(23) = 2.9. As is evident from Figure 2 , there was no inhibition, following completion of the observe instruction, for perform scripts as compared with their neutral partners, f (23) < 1. These results are somewhat striking considering that people tested in this experiment either had just worked with the props or had watched the experimenter work with them. One a priori prediction that could have been made was that test items from the prospective (perform and observe) scripts should have been identified more quickly in the LDT because of their recent exposure. Stated slightly differently, the prospective test items had been encountered twice, once during learning and again when people mentally rehearsed the scripts to perform them correctly or to identify whether the experimenter had performed the tasks correctly. We were originally quite concerned about this possibility because it might have weakened any observation of inhibition in this experiment. Rather than having quicker response times as might be predicted from this priming standpoint, people were universally slower to respond to the items that came from the tasks they had completed themselves. This consideration does raise the important question of whether the inhibition effect would have been larger if the intention's status could have been fulfilled (i.e., completed) in some way other than working with the props that the scripts had specified.
The foregoing argument also makes it rather implausible that what is being labeled inhibition here is merely a function of the time between encoding and the assessment of activation. Obviously, the delay is slightly longer between study and test in this experiment as compared with Experiment 1. Because of counterbalancing, that latency was, on average, the same for both the prospective script and its neutral partner at the time when the LDT was undertaken (i.e., approximately 1 min). For the results to be a function of time, the corresponding inhibition effects should have been observed in the prospective-observe script, which did not occur. That is, differential decay in the prospective-perform and perspective-observe scripts cannot explain the pattern of results obtained in this experiment, especially in light of the greater priming that would be expected to have accrued from working with items as opposed to watching the experimenter work with them. The results of Experiment 3, to which we now turn, also contravene a simple decay interpretation.
Experiment 3
Together, the results of Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that intentions about performed actions that are, as yet, uncompleted may have a privileged status in memory in terms of their accessibility. Intentions related to performance that have been completed appear to undergo deactivation, or inhibition, relative to the remaining neutral contents of memory. In Experiment 1, activation of the components of prospective-perform and perspective-observe scripts was measured prior to script completion, whereas in Experiment 2, that measurement occurred after completion. Assuming that each of the two blocks of the experiment was fairly independent, as was emphasized to the participants, the purpose of Experiment 3 was to replicate the major findings of Experiments 1 and 2 by using a within-subjects manipulation of when activation was measured. On the basis of Goschke and Kuhl's (1993) findings and our own that the prospective-observe script is less sensitive to experimental manipulations, it was replaced in Experiment 3 with a second prospective-perform script.
5 Thus, each participant in this next experiment learned two pairs of scripts and actually had to perform one script from each pair. For one pair, lexical decision preceded performance, and for the second pair, lexical decision followed performance of the script. If the results of Experiments 1 and 2 are robust and genuine, then the straightforward prediction is that a crossover interaction should be obtained in which greater activation should be found when lexical decision precedes fulfillment of the intention to perform the script and less activation should be found when lexical decision follows it (relative to the neutral script partners).
Method
Participants. Thirty-two undergraduates volunteered in exchange for partial course credit. Three of these people were replacements for individuals who did not follow directions or who could not perform the scripts perfectly (see footnote 3). None had participated in the previous experiments.
Materials and procedure. The procedure was identical to that of the preceding two experiments with the following exceptions. People were told that they would learn two pairs of scripts and would be asked to perform from memory one script from each pair. Complete counterbalancing ensured that each script was observed as the prospective and the neutral script in both the first and second blocks and ensured that which script in the pair was learned first was counterbalanced, just as in Experiments 1 and 2. Half of the participants received the LDT prior to performance in the first block and after performance in the second block. The order was reversed for the remaining people. The composition of the LDT was identical to that of the LDTs in the earlier two experiments, with 10 words from each script, 10 nonscript words matched for frequency and length, and 20 nonwords for each script. Thus, there were 80 critical items in each of the two LDTs, with 12 buffer items (6 words and 6 nonwords) preceding the test sequence. All other aspects of the instructions and testing were identical in detail and timing to those reported for Experiment 1.
Results and Discussion
Inaccurate responses, which comprised only 3.4% of the trials, were eliminated. Of the remaining trials, 1.6% were determined to be outliers and were eliminated from the analyses. As in the previous experiments, the overall speed for the three classes of items followed an orderly progression in which people were slowest with nonwords, were faster with neutral but valid English words (i.e., nonscript words), and were fastest with the script items, F(2, 62) = 57.0, MSE = 1,985.0. The means are set forth in Table 1 . By simple contrast, the nonscript items were responded to more slowly than the script items, f(31) = 13.7, but were responded to more quickly than the nonwords, t(31) -5.2.
The critical outcome is displayed in Figure 3 . As is readily seen in that figure, a crossover interaction in response latency was obtained, F(l, 31) = 13.7, MSE = 1,841.1. The left pair of bars in Figure 3 depicts latency for the components of the prospective-perform script when it was assessed before fulfilling the intention. The right pair of bars depicts latency after fulfilling the intention. Simple compari- sons relative to its neutral partner confirmed that latency was faster for the prospective script items before performance (left bars in Figure 3 ), *(31) = 2.7, and was slower after performance (right bars), f(31) = 3.0. This pattern of results would be expected if the intention-superiority effect reflects both heightened activation of an uncompleted intention and deactivation of a completed intention relative to more neutral contents in memory. This inhibitory effect is a novel finding that has now been replicated a second time.
Given the nature of the significant interaction, neither of the main effects in the preceding analysis was statistically significant. There was no evidence that the components of the two prospective-perform scripts were any faster than those of the two neutral scripts, F(l, 31) < 1.0. Overall response latency also did not differ as a function of testing prior to or after completion of the intention, F(l, 31) < 1.0. With respect to this second null outcome, the two scripts tested after completion might have been predicted to have an overall lower level of activation (i.e., longer latencies) as compared with the pair tested prior to completion (on the basis of the results of Experiment 1). This did not occur. As a consequence, the slower latency for the script that had been performed when lexical decision followed completion necessarily meant that the latency for the neutral script in that tested-after condition was about as fast as the to-beperformed script in the tested-before condition. However, the same pattern of results was found in a between-subjects analysis of just the first block of trials. Thus, counterbalancing within subjects which assessment of activation came first (i.e., before vs. after performance) did not lead to any sort of differential carryover effects that might arise from using a repeated measures experimental design.
One interpretation of this pattern of results is that as in Anderson's (1983) ACT* model of memory, overall level of activation for items in memory at any given time is fairly constant. Therefore, measurement of activation yields a relative measure at the time it is taken. In Anderson's model, the fixed and asymptotic amount of activation is assumed to be distributed unevenly among the concepts that are activated in working memory (p. 94). This view is consistent both with the interpretation that the intention-superiority effect is a function of activation and inhibition and with the interpretation that people approached the two pairs of scripts in each block of the experiment fairly independently. Moreover, in Anderson's model, goal nodes that have been achieved are popped (i.e., shut off) from the stack, and this process accounts for changes in focused attention (p. 33). Once popped, a source node's activation decays rapidly (p. 29). The inhibitory effect found in Experiments 2 and 3 is entirely consistent with this model.
Although we return to this notion in the General Discussion section, we do note now that this interpretation is consistent with our intuitions about how people normally shift their attention from task to task throughout the day. Our intuition is that after people complete one task, their attention is directed toward making a decision about which of several tasks will be completed next. According to this account, having completed an activity, the neutral script with which it was paired may automatically receive some activation as a candidate for completion. Although we have no evidence for this intuition, we raise this possible link between this laboratory task and more naturally occurring prospective memory because it is entirely consistent with Anderson's (1983) account and may represent a point of departure for other researchers who wish to pursue it. 6 Experiment 4
The manipulations in Experiments 1-3 measured activation at different points in time. In Experiments 1 and 3, measurement between the establishment of an intention and its fulfillment suggested that memories related to intentions about prospective performance were more available (i.e., more activated relative to neutral material). In Experiments 2 and 3, measurement after the fulfillment of a previously established intention suggested that memories related to these completed activities were less available (i.e., deactivated or inhibited relative to neutral material). One of the only other times that activation could be assessed in this paradigm was during the completion of an intention. Interrupting people in the middle of a task to assess the level of activation of that script and its neutral mate constitutes a Zeigarnik manipulation. The Zeigamik effect is the experimental result that people have better memories, on average, for tasks that they have not yet fully completed as compared with tasks that they have completed. In a typical Zeigarnik experiment, people are asked to perform 10 or more simple activities (e.g., solving mathematical problems). On half of these tasks, they are interrupted and are not allowed to complete them. Later, when asked to write down all of the tasks they had engaged in, people generally remember more of the tasks that were interrupted as compared with the ones they were allowed to complete.
The theoretical and empirical work on the Zeigarnik effect is a tangled web of conflicting reports (Butterfield, 1964; Goschke & Kuhl, 1993) , and therefore, a detailed treatment is beyond the scope of this article. The general result for completed tasks, however, is similar in kind to the inhibition effects obtained in Experiments 2 and 3 after the scripts had been completed. In those two experiments, memories for a completed intention were less available. Likewise in the Zeigarnik effect, memories for completed activities were less available as evidenced by their poorer recall. If these similarities are genuine, even at a very general level, then several predictions can be made for the paradigm adopted in Experiments 1-3. First, an interrupted task should show heightened activation relative to a neutral mate because the intention has yet to be fulfilled (i.e., it is still a prospective activity). Second, and on the one hand, the completed portion of an interrupted activity could show some inhibition relative to the uncompleted portion if inhibition operates at the component level of multistage activities. On the other hand, if deactivation occurs as a function of completing the entire activity, then both the completed and the uncompleted components could be relatively available as compared with neutral memories that have no intentionality associated with them. Third, the deactivation seen in Experiments 2 and 3 should be observed again in a within-subjects design in which one script is interrupted and the other is allowed to be completed before the assessment of its activation. These specific hypotheses were tested in Experiment 4.
Method
Participants. Twenty-four people from the same pool as in Experiments 1-3 participated in exchange for course credit. None had participated before. Two people were replaced for performing the script incorrectly (see footnote 3).
Materials and procedure. The materials had to be updated for this experiment. In Experiments 1-3, each script comprised five action sequences. In this experiment, a sixth action was added so that the participants could be interrupted directly after performing the third action in each script. Because comparisons were going to be made for the first half against the second half of each script, word frequency and syllabic length were equated across this variable for the four scripts. For each pair of scripts, the 4 new words were added to the LDT, as were 4 new valid, neutral English words (i.e., nonscript words), and 8 nonwords. Thus, rather than 80 critical items on each of the two LDTs, there were 96 in this experiment. All other aspects of the materials and testing remained unchanged.
People were instructed that they would learn two separate pairs of scripted actions and that they would be required to perform one script in each pair (i.e., the same instructions used in Experiment 3). Thus, each prospective script was one that was to be performed. The prospective-observe condition was not tested, just as it was not tested in Experiment 3. As in Experiments 1-3, instructions for making lexical decisions were given before participants learned the first pair of scripts. Learning time was increased by 10 s when a script was presented on the computer because of the sixth activity that was added in this experiment. Complete counterbalancing ensured mat each script was observed in all prospective and neutral conditions, for completed and interrupted scripts, and across location and block of the experiment. Likewise, half of the participants were interrupted in the first block and half were interrupted in the second block. The experimenter interrupted each participant directly after the third component of the to-beinterrupted script with the following: "Wait! I have made a mistake. You were supposed to do the decision task on the computer first. You can finish that later." This verbal instruction should have caused people to form the intention to complete the task later At this point, the experimenter immediately led the participant back to the computer, and the LDT was administered by the experimental software. After lexical decision, the participant finished performing the script. If the script was uninterrupted, then the participant was allowed to complete the activity in its entirety before the LDT was administered.
Results and Discussion
On average, 3.8% of the lexical-decision trials were eliminated because of incorrect responses. Of the remaining trials, 1.3% were classified as outliers and eliminated from the analyses. Latency for each class of items reliably replicated latencies for Experiments 1-3, as set forth in the last two rows of data in Table 1 . Participants responded fastest to script items, more slowly to nonscript items, and slowest to nonwords, F(2, 46) = 51.2, MSE = 2,398.8. The simple contrasts between nonscript and script items, t(23) = 8.3, and nonscript words and nonwords, ?(23) = 5.0, were statistically significant.
Latency for the script items is depicted in Figure 4 . As in Experiment 3, there was a significant crossover interaction among the experimental conditions, F(l, 23) = 8.2, MSE = 1,633.7. When the script was uninterrupted and was completed before the assessment of activation (the two right hand bars of Figure 4 ), the components of the prospective script were less available than the components of the neutral script about which no intention to perform had been made, f(23) = 2.1. These results wholly replicated those of Experiments 2 and 3. In contrast, when the script was interrupted in the middle of its execution (the two left hand bars of Figure 4 ), the components of those prospective scripts were more available than those belonging to the neutral scripts with which they had been paired, f(23) = 2.0. Interestingly, in the interrupted condition, there was no difference in people's speed for items from the portion of the activity they had already completed (574.9 ms) as compared with items they had yet to perform (574.4 ms), f(23) < 1.0. Therefore, for the interrupted script as a whole, the pattern of results was similar to the assessment of activation before fulfilling the intention as tested in Experiments 1 and 3.
These results suggest that an interrupted activity, like an uncompleted one, may have some privileged availability in memory. In addition, all components of that script, not just the ones that had yet to be completed, were more available than those of the neutral script. Some anecdotal evidence is relevant to that claim. The experimenter who collected the data reported that after making lexical decisions in the interrupted condition, participants occasionally would verbally repeat the first three actions in order to pick up correctly where they had left off. Therefore, people who were interrupted may have needed to keep all components of the intention activated in order to complete it successfully later. We now consider what the results of this experiment, and of Experiments 1-3, imply for the formation and completion of an intention.
General Discussion
In Experiments 1-4, participants learned pairs of distinct, simple scripts that consisted of a sequence of actions. At the time the scripts were learned, people did not know which script they would have to perform and which they would have to observe. In Experiments 1 and 3, people who were told that they would have to carry out one of the scripts displayed shorter lexical-decision latencies for that script as compared with the neutral script about which no actionassociated intention had been formed. Therefore, Goschke and Kuhl's (1993) four experiments with recognition latency have now been replicated twice. Experiment 4 extended these predictions to a case in which an activity was only partially completed. As measured by lexical decision, interrupted and uncompleted intentions also have a heightened accessibility, presumably because of their status as being still prospective in nature. These results support the important notion that the intentional component of prospective memories may have some privileged status in declarative memory.
The interpretation of these results suggests that the declarative representation of an intention might have accrued heightened activation from the instruction to perform the script. On completing the intention, we reasoned that there would be no need for that representation to continue to exhibit any privileged status in memory. In Experiments 2-4, people completed the activity as prescribed in the instructions and then engaged in lexical decision. In these three experiments, latency for the constituents of the prospective-perform scripts was reliably slower than for the constituents of the neutral scripts. Applying the standard interpretation that activation is inversely related to response latency, those results suggest that after performing an activity, the constituents either rapidly lose activation (i.e., decay) or are actively inhibited. There is some generality to these claims as shown by the fact that the between-subjects effects across Experiments 1 and 2 held when precompletion and postcompletion was tested within subjects in Experiment 3.
From a theoretical standpoint, our results may generalize only to the memorial status of intentions (or intended activities) and not more generally to theories of prospective memory. Limited generalization stems from the fact that we do not know whether participants expected to be cued by the experimenter to perform the script (see footnote I). If they did, then the intentions we have studied in this article are somewhat different than the intentions that form the declarative portion of a real prospective memory. These latter intentions may be associated with a level of self-initiated cuing that the intentions we have studied might lack. Perhaps intentions that people establish for themselves enjoy even greater availability. Having raised this caveat, these results may still have some bearing on how people might accomplish the intentions that they do establish for themselves. For example, time-based intentions are ones that have no external cue and may require a great deal of self-initiated processing to carry out the task successfully (Craik, 1986 ; but see Einstein, McDaniel, Richardson, Guynn, & Cunfer, 1995) . If the declarative representation of an intention has some heightened activation, then it may come to mind more easily or more frequently, thereby increasing the probability that a time-based task is accomplished. For event-based intentions, Mantyla (1996) spoke of "retrieval sensitivity" (p. 93) in which planning and task monitoring increase the probability that an event will be noticed and that the prospective intentionality about the event will be recalled. As discussed in our introduction, his positive findings with priming a prospective response are consistent with this notion of heightened accessibility. Goschke and Kuhl (1993) interpreted their findings in terms of Anderson's (1983) ACT* model of memory. As mentioned earlier in the Results and Discussion section of Experiment 3, the results from these four experiments are entirely consistent with that model. Assuming that the amount of activation at any given time is fairly constant, measuring the activation of prospective memories and more neutral materials yields a relative measure. Thus, our data suggest that intentions that have not yet been fulfilled are more available than neutral materials. Likewise, the relative measure suggests that completed intentions are less available than neutral materials. Of course, the argument could be made that neutral materials have received heightened activation following completion of an intention, or that neutral materials are inhibited prior to completing an intention. Such an argument is simply the other side of the same coin with a relative measure. We believe, however, that framing the differences in results across Experiments 1-4 is best accomplished with respect to what changed across those experiments. Presumably, intentionality with respect to the neutral materials did not change, whereas intentionality for the prospective-perform scripts did. Most importantly, the intentionality associated with the prospective-perform scripts changed as a function of whether people had completed them.
Although we have framed our results in terms of activation and inhibition, these concepts could be theoretically side-stepped to some degree by appealing to the revival rate of a memory trace when it is encountered again, as portrayed in the source-monitoring framework (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993) . Viewing the intention-superiority effect as a consequence of differences in the rates of revival of memory traces may be fruitful because people contend with many intentions, activating and deactivating them throughout the day. The claim that all of these intentions possess a heightened level of activation might be somewhat unrealistic. To claim that they are later reprocessed more quickly or more efficiently would allow an explanation for why people are adept at both time-based and event-based prospective memory tasks. This revival account is suggested only as an alternative conceptualization and in no way contravenes an account based solely on heightened activation or on a combination of both activation and inhibition.
This discussion does raise, however, the general issue of the type of intention that is being studied in this paradigm. The scripts were short sequences of actions, the assessment of activation lasted but a few minutes (approximately three), and then the intention was fulfilled which took but a minute itself. Longer term intentions (e.g., to write a manuscript) may not display the same sort of privileged status, or perhaps they display an accentuated degree of quick processing because they have been processed and reprocessed so many times in the past. In a similar way, the scripts that were tested were originally learned to criterion, such that the order of the constituents was unambiguous and fixed. When someone forms an intention, say to pick up some milk and some dry cleaning after work, it is unclear just how detailed that intention may be. For example, does one explicitly plan whether the milk will be purchased before the trip to the cleaners? These issues are not raised necessarily as criticisms, but as considerations for researchers who want to pursue the intention-superiority effect. If the effects of word frequency and other factors could be controlled for in lexical decision, perhaps there would be a way to test people's intentions that they have established for themselves (e.g., Marsh, Hicks, & Landau, in press ).
We claimed earlier that the slower latencies of completed activities might reflect inhibition. There is no way empirically to distinguish active inhibition of a memory trace from the claim that a faster decay rate is responsible for the slower latencies. Theoretically, however, it may make sense to interpret the effect as inhibition. In theories of action control, people need to be able to deactivate information in working memory to focus sustained attention on a current task. In Norman and Shallice's (1986) model of central executive functioning, current tasks are handled by the firing of action schemas. The firing of one action schema causes lateral inhibition of other activated materials similar to the effects observed in the crossover interactions in the present Experiments 3 and 4 (cf. Shallice & Burgess, 1991) . Similarly, in Anderson's (1983) ACT* model, current tasks are carried out by the firing of procedural production rules. In both theories, the contents of working memory are matched to stored preexisting conditions that, once fired, guide behavioral responses. It would be adaptive upon finishing an activity to be able to inhibit the conditions that led to a certain response in order to avoid repeating it.
There is abundant evidence in the field of perception for inhibitory mechanisms at the very lowest levels of automatic actions. For example, in the phenomenon of inhibition of return, latency is slower for processing a stimulus that is located in the same position as it was on the previous trial as compared with a stimulus that appears in a new location (Kwak & Egeth, 1992; Tipper, Driver, & Weaver, 1991) . The interpretation of this phenomenon is that it is adaptive in terms of the amount of information obtained from the visual field if resampling the same location is actively avoided (i.e., inhibited). Thus, it would be adaptive in terms of higher order cognitive processing to do a similar thing. Inhibiting a completed response would avoid its repetition.
To the extent that the intention-superiority effect reflects both an activation of declarative representations related to intentions and an inhibition of more neutral declarative memories, the exact cognitive mechanisms have yet to be specified. In our own work, we have considered the importance of attentional mechanisms and central executive resources to prospective remembering (Marsh & Hicks, 1998 ; see also Einstein, Smith, McDaniel, & Shaw, 1997) . Taxing central executive resources, as opposed to more peripheral systems such as the articulatory loop, led to prospective performance deficits in event-based tasks that required a response to be made to external cues. Perhaps as an intention is formed, it is placed into a heightened state of activity, or perhaps it is marked in some way for later processing or in a way that facilitates that later processing (Kuhl & Kazen-Saad, 1988) . As discussed earlier, facilitated processing may result in faster memorial revival rates. There is some neuropsychological evidence that the formation of an intention is a functionally different form of encoding as evidenced by additional frontal lobe activity (Shallice & Burgess, 1991) . As more is learned about executive functioning, perhaps the adaptive aspects of the cognitive system that support prospective memory can be assigned more definitively to the declarative-encoding phase versus the retrieval stage (e.g., heightened revivability) at which time an intention is actually carried out.
